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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the status of community
intelligence within The National Intelligence
Model (NIM) in the UK. The study included
focused interviews with 23 intelligence practi-
tioners across the UK police service, combined
with open-ended interviews with academics and
persons working to implement the NIM. The
results indicate that police officers and informants
are the most trusted and the most used sources of
intelligence, and that the use of community
intelligence is marginal. A combination of police
culture, lack of knowledge within management
and police officers, the absence of a general
definition of ‘intelligence’, a lack of guidance
around community intelligence and the secrecy
surrounding intelligence, stand out as factors that
may explain the low status and use of community
intelligence.
INTRODUCTION
The use of intelligence in both policing and
other contexts has an international reson-
ance whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, the
United Kingdom or in the US. This paper
will explore some of the implications of its
usage and its failings in the police in one
country, the United Kingdom. The findings
are of particular importance in an elucida-
tion of the events that happened in London
on 7 July 2005.
The implementation of The National
Intelligence Model (NIM) in the British
police service in 2000 (Grieve, 2004;
NCIS, 2000) has been an attempt to pro-
fessionalise the police by providing a com-
mon structure and framework for police
decision-making. The decision-making is
intelligence-driven (John & Maguire, 2004,
p. 9) and John and Maguire state that it
‘provides . . . a cohesive intelligence frame-
work across the full range of levels of crim-
inality and disorder’ (p. 8). For many police
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officers intelligence equals information
from covert technical sources or covert
human intelligence sources such as inform-
ants and undercover officers (Robertson,
1992, as cited in Hebenton & Thomas,
1995) and for the purpose of this article is
termed traditional intelligence. Traditional
intelligence implies that information from
other sources such as the public and partner
organisations, is not commonly perceived as
intelligence by police officers. Several
reports have highlighted that the NIM
implementation has struggled to involve the
community, both public and partner
agencies (Cope, 2004; John & Maguire,
2003; Ratcliffe, 2003; Sheptycki, 2004)
and, in Diversity Matters (Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2003) Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC) notes that not all forces in England
and Wales are currently developing com-
munity intelligence in the same way as
criminal intelligence. Police use of intelli-
gence from the community has been sub-
ject to scrutiny and critical comment, most
significantly in the Macpherson report
(Macpherson, 1999), the Bichard inquiry
(Bichard, 2004) and the Victoria Climbié
inquiry (Laming, 2003).
This article, based on qualitative research
conducted within eight English police
forces, examines the perception and use of
community intelligence as a source of intel-
ligence within the NIM. There will be a
discussion around notable issues concerning
the NIM, particularly those that may influ-
ence the use of community intelligence,
such as various interpretations of the term
‘intelligence’, a lack of clear guidance, and
‘uneducated customers’. It will examine
how community intelligence is prioritised
within the NIM, and also set out possible
consequences of this prioritisation. The dis-
sonance between the presentation of the
NIM, what it could achieve, and how it is
actually used is noted. The answer to this
may be that the NIM was developed with
the preliminary intentions of focusing on
efficiency and heightening detection rates,
and that community safety and quality of
life issues were added late in its develop-
ment. These outcomes are strongly linked
to community intelligence. Finally the ter-
rorist bombings in London on 7th July
2005 have increased the focus on the
importance of community intelligence and
this will be discussed in the conclusion.
Emergence of intelligence-led policing
Intelligence has been recognised as being
important in policing since the formation
of the modern police service in the United
Kingdom where Sir Charles Rowan, one of
the two original commissioners of the
Metropolitan Police Service, had an intelli-
gence role in Wellington’s Peninsular Army
(Grieve, 2004, pp. 26–27; Metropolitan
Police Service, 2005). However, for much
of the service’s history, intelligence has had
a peripheral role in policing, looked upon
as something that adds to the investigative
picture (Ratcliffe, 2004) or supports the
operational capability of the organisation
(Nicholl, 2004, p. 55) rather than a tool that
drives strategy. The 1990s saw the emer-
gence of ‘Intelligence-led Policing’ (ILP)
which came about as the result of two
drivers, one internal and one external. The
internal drive came from developments
with the use of intelligence in the police
service (Grieve), while the external drive
came from questions raised about the effi-
ciency of police investigative practices
(Cope, Fielding, & Innes, 2005, p. 41). In
1993 the Audit Commission reported that
most crimes were committed by a small
number of offenders and that the police
should identify and target high-risk groups
(Audit Commission, 1993). The emphasis
was on ‘targeting the criminal not the
crime’ (Tilley, 2003b, p. 313) and that in
the absence of admission evidence the
police would need to increase their focus
on evidence which is ‘forensic . . . and
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intelligence-based’ (Audit Commission,
p. 32). The report encouraged the use of
covert investigative techniques such as sur-
veillance and the use of paid informants and
undercover officers (Harfield & Harfield,
2005; Hobbs, 2001). Intelligence purported
to be about targeting criminals and it was
therefore closely linked to evidence of
criminal activity. In 1997 HMIC published
Policing with Intelligence (Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997a) which
identified a number of key factors as essen-
tial for the implementation of intelligence-
led policing; these included an integrated
intelligence structure, key performance
indicators, and the cooperation of partners.
Common to both reports is the focus on
intelligence gathering and analysis.
By the end of the decade a number of
policing organisations, including the Asso-
ciation of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),
had identified the need to formalise
intelligence-led policing into a policy that
could be adopted nationally by the 43
forces in England and Wales (Grieve, 2004;
John & Maguire, 2003), and in 2000 the
National Criminal Intelligence Service
(NCIS) piloted the NIM in three force
areas. By the end of 2004, the NIM had
been implemented in varying degrees in all
43 police forces in England and Wales.
Supporters of the NIM claim it is a
‘business model’ that aims to professionalise
police practices and to secure a more effect-
ive gathering, sharing and use of intelli-
gence (Grieve, 2004; John & Maguire,
2003; NCIS, 2000). Still, it remains an
aspiration to implement a functioning
national IT system for the exchange of intel-
ligence between UK police forces: the pres-
ent national IT platform supports only the
Police National Computer, providing access
to vehicle records, previous convictions and
Schengen information categories (Bichard,
2004, p. 6; Rogerson, 2004). The NIM
model structures the intelligence into three
levels: ‘Level 1’, local issues; ‘Level 2’,
regional issues; and ‘Level 3’, national and
international matters (NCIS). The NIM
defines several tasks on ‘Level 1’ that should
be especially prioritised and focused upon,
such as managing volume crime, disorder
and community issues, and cooperation
with partners and outside agencies (John &
Maguire, p. 43; NCIS). A vital part of the
NIM is the ‘Tasking and Coordination
Group’ (TCG). The TCGs hold frequent
tactical meetings (approximately every fort-
night) to determine what intelligence to
gather, to make tactical assessments, and to
decide how to allocate the resources most
effectively. Strategic TCGs are held more
seldom (approximately every six months).
These meetings set priorities both locally
and at force-level. The model is repeated at
regional level (Tilley, 2003b). Intelligence
fuels the tasking and coordinating process
of the NIM at each level and it is informed
by four intelligence products (Tilley,
pp. 321–324):
(1) strategic assessments — long-term plan-
ning, strategies and policies;
(2) tactical assessments — short-term and
operational planning;
(3) target profiles — profiles of offenders;
(4) problem profiles — profiles of series of
offences or offenders.
Tilley (p. 323) states that ‘what comprises
intelligence to feed into these products is
not discussed in detail but can evidently be
wide ranging and is often obtained by
covert means’.
Challenges
The implementation of the NIM and
intelligence-led policing have not been
without problems, since the police service
has lacked an ‘intelligence culture’ (John &
Maguire, 2004, p. 9), with problems around
definitions of intelligence, the knowledge
of the intelligence users, confusion around
sources of intelligence and the purposes for
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gathering and using intelligence. Moreover,
the culture tends to value evidence over the
wider uses of intelligence.
An increasingly important issue in both
intelligence-led policing and the NIM is
the definition of intelligence itself. For the
Audit Commission (1993, p. 32) intelli-
gence was a form of evidence, whilst Butler
(2004, p. 14) defines intelligence in his
report as a ‘technique for improving the
basis of knowledge’. In its Intelligence Unit
Manual the Metropolitan Police Service
states that, ‘it is information designed for
action’ (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Con-
stabulary, 2002, p. 46). Perhaps most sur-
prising of all is the absence of a definition of
intelligence within the original guidance
for the NIM, so that for the first years of
the roll out there was no guiding definition
of intelligence. Subsequently, a definition of
intelligence has been published in the
revised NIM Manual of Guidance: ‘intelli-
gence is defined as information that has
been subject to a defined evaluation and
risk assessment process in order to assist
with police decision making’ (Centrex,
2005, p. 13). This most recent definition
makes no reference to source and gives little
guidance as to purpose.
Intelligence can be collected from a
range of sources, but there are discussions
around what constitutes valid sources of
intelligence (Dunninghan & Norris, 1999).
Cope et al. (2005, p. 43) refer to the use of
‘open’ sources (for example, newspapers
and the public) and ‘closed’ sources (for
example, informants). Robertson reports
that ‘to the police, intelligence often means
nothing more than information by a covert
source,’ (Robertson, 1992, as cited in
Hebenton & Thomas, 1995, p. 170) and he
emphasises that to most police officers
intelligence equals information from covert
technical sources, covert human sources
(informants) or from undercover officers.
Butler (2004) points to the risk of relying
on only one source of intelligence and in
doing so missing the real picture. The use of
a confined set of data can hinder the police
from identifying new criminal threats
(Butler; Ratcliffe & Sheptycki, 2004,
p. 205). It is therefore vital to look outside
the police force and to cooperate with non-
police agencies to ‘expand both the scope
and range of intelligence’ (Ratcliffe &
Sheptycki, p. 205). The implication for the
NIM when the intelligence comes from
non-covert sources, especially the com-
munity, will be taken up later in this
article.
Police managers are a vital part of the
NIM process. Ratcliffe (2004, p. 3) states
that a common problem within an
intelligence-led approach is that many of
the senior managers are former detectives
with an expertise within investigation but
not intelligence. He suggests that adopting
the terminology of intelligence-led policing
may be simpler than implementing the
model itself (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 55).
Williamson (2005) discusses the problem
with delivering community policing when
there is a pressure to deliver results, and he
especially highlights England with its new
‘top down command and control’ manage-
ment system (p. 5). The NCIS (2000) states
in the NIM implementation manual that
‘“the need to know” is widely recognised as
the backbone of the intelligence doctrine
. . . and is restricted to those who have
authorised access’. Dunninghan and Norris
(1999, p. 84) express concern for the poss-
ible loss of control and accountability
within an intelligence-led approach since
most of the information is hidden away
because of ‘sensitivity’ issues. Cope et al.
(2005, p. 43) reveal that closed sources of
information like informants and data bases
were used more often than intelligence
from open sources such as the public.
Manning (2001, p. 99) states that the ‘chan-
nel by which the message is sent’ is of
importance to the police officer and that to
the police ‘a mediated communication is
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suspect . . . the more abstract and distant
from the officer’s experience, the less it is
trusted’. This position is further supported
by Cope (2004) who found similar issues in
her research. She discovered cultural issues
amongst police officers, and that the police
worked on ‘constructed experiential knowl-
edge’, this being in principal to target the
usual suspects, a concept referred to as
‘policing led intelligence’ (p. 199). A well-
known but disturbing claim is corroborated
through her study, namely that police
organisational culture, preconceptions and
prejudice can suppress the open-minded
thinking that analysts can bring to intelli-
gence processing.
From its inception the NIM was
intended to professionalise police practices
to secure a more effective gathering, shar-
ing, and use of intelligence (Grieve, 2004;
John & Maguire, 2003; NCIS, 2000).
Grieve identifies the three tasks of intelli-
gence: to make local strategic decisions
about crime and disorder, to inform tactical
and operational activity and to support
strategy and policy making. However
Manning (2001, p. 101) questions whether
the NIM can deliver its stated outcomes
and identifies ‘a basic contradiction in man-
date . . . that policing can control crime,
reduce the fear of crime, and yet be an
entirely responsive, demand-driven, situ-
ational force dispensing just in time and just
enough order maintenance’. Dupont (1999,
p. 1) questions whether the police service
can achieve anticipated outcomes or
whether they evaluate their successes
through ‘the fallacy of quantification’ where
outputs are more important than outcomes (p. 1).
Byrne and Pease (2003, p. 306) observe that
‘one of the major tragedies of policing is
that somehow actions have become
divorced from their underlying purpose, to
remain justified only by minimum standards
of performance bureaucratically expressed.
Arresting and imprisoning and offender is
a “good result” only so far as it precludes
the commission of further crime by the
same person’. They go on to say that in
the delivery of crime reduction it is import-
ant to ‘reassert the purpose over process’,
in other words, to ensure that the NIM as
a business model delivers its stated
outcomes.
Community intelligence
The NCIS asserted that the NIM is a model
that focuses on all law enforcement needs
and that it is not just about crime and
criminals (NCIS, 2000). The NCIS claims
that the NIM can ‘serve the community
intelligence requirements of Winning the
Race’ (p. 7). In the thematic inspection
report, Winning the Race, it was found that
those policing areas that had the most suc-
cessful relationship with their communities
were those which involved the public in
their policy-making process and formal
community consultation processes (Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary,
1997). One of several recommendations
from the HMIC inspectors was that ‘Com-
munity intelligence should be valued by
force managers as highly as criminal intel-
ligence in terms of its contribution to
effective policing’.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constab-
ulary subsequently found that most forces
were not able to define community intelli-
gence adequately and addressed this by
defining community intelligence as:
local information, direct or indirect, that
when assessed provides intelligence on
the quality of life experienced by indi-
viduals and groups, that informs both the
strategic and operational perspectives in
the policing of local communities
(1997b, p. 47).
Here, in contrast to the absence of a defini-
tion of intelligence within the NIM, is a
definition that articulates both the source
and purpose for the intelligence. The need
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for a formalised use of community intelli-
gence within the NIM is finally emphasised
through Diversity Matters (Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2003). In this
report HMIC comments that not all forces
in England and Wales are currently develop-
ing and spreading community intelligence
as they do with criminal intelligence. Sev-
eral examples of the gravity of not gather-
ing intelligence from the community are
found. The Bichard inquiry (Bichard,
2004), examining the police actions before
the Soham murders, revealed a lack of
cooperation between partners, as did the
Victoria Climbié inquiry (Laming, 2003),
which examined the abuse leading to the
death of Victoria Climbié. The report
unveiled serial negligence including a dis-
turbing absence of cooperation between
partners. Because of poor information shar-
ing between the social services, the police
and the health agencies, there was a failure
to analyse and assess risks and missed oppor-
tunities in identifying and solving them.
A pivotal point was made on the import-
ance of community intelligence after the 7
July 2005 attacks in London. The Chair of
the Association of Chief Police Officers
Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee
(ACPO TAM), Ken Jones, in giving evid-
ence to the Parliamentary Intelligence and
Security Committee (ISC), spoke of the
need to think more widely about intelli-
gence, and pointed out that an extensive
picture of 7 July was produced by the media
from openly available information and wit-
nesses, not secret intelligence (ISC, 2006,
para. 134). He further underlined that the
use of open source information is necessary
for the Security Service and the police to
identify radicalisation and thus to prevent
future attacks. The ISC states that ‘the value
of closer joint working between the Secur-
ity Service and the police on a more local
level is one of the key lessons to arise from
the July attacks’ (ISC, para. 135).
For such an integration of community
intelligence to take place there needs to be
clarity about how community intelligence
and other types of intelligence are related.
Here the work of Cope et al. (2005, p. 44)
provides a useful contribution by dividing
intelligence into four types:
(1) Criminal intelligence — data on
known offenders;
(2) Crime intelligence — data on specific
crime or series of crimes;
(3) Community intelligence — based upon
data from ‘ordinary’ members of the
public concerning the quality of life
and tensions impacting upon their
community;
(4) Contextual intelligence — social, cul-
tural and economic factors that may
impact on crime and offending.
The challenge for the police service is how
to integrate these various different readings
of intelligence. The first two, criminal and
crime intelligence, sit well within the cur-
rent cultural mindset of policing — namely,
traditional intelligence. The second two,
however, being more related to probabilistic
information, will require the integration of
more fragmentary pieces of information.
This seems to be more difficult for the
police service to include as a source of
intelligence and this is the research gap
which this article seeks to fill.
METHODOLOGY
There has been an initial evaluation of
implementation of the NIM by the Home
Office (John & Maguire, 2003), but no
research has so far tested whether the com-
munity is being used actively as a source of
intelligence. This study sought to identify
the level of integration of community intel-
ligence into NIM utilisation and so the aims
of this research investigation have been:
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● To identify what intelligence practi-
tioners understand by ‘intelligence’
within the context of the NIM;
● To identify the level of understanding
and importance put on community
intelligence within the NIM;
● To identify the level of community intel-
ligence used as a main source in the
creation of ‘target profiles’ and ‘problem
profiles’.
This research is designed as a case study. It
can be argued that case studies offer insuffi-
cient basis for generalisation if compared
with an alternative methodology, the sur-
vey. Although the survey is the best method
for giving a statistical generalisation, an
appropriate case study can give a good
analytical generalisation (Yin, 2003, p. 37).
To ensure both reliability and validity the
case study involved the gathering of several
sources of data — triangulation (Hayden &
Shawyer, 2004, pp. 51–52; Yin, 2003,
p. 97). Four sources of data were used,
namely open-ended interviews with intelli-
gence experts, focused interviews with
practitioners, the use of secondary docu-
mentation such as official research reports
and observation. The reason for using more
than one method is to produce a result that
does not solely depend on how one method
is conducted, or used. Collecting case study
data in this manner promotes the advant-
ageous possibility that the findings and con-
clusions will be more accurate as they are
based on many different sources of informa-
tion, using a ‘corroboratory mode’ (Yin,
p. 98).
The sample
The sample of areas to visit for the focused
interviews resulted from a consideration of
several factors, for example, police forces
where the NIM was piloted, police
forces which the experts advised the
researcher to look at (see the open-ended
interviews), and forces which for practical/
transport reasons were manageable to reach
within a certain time frame. Another
important factor was to cover both city and
rural areas, together with both the south
and the north of England and Northern
Ireland, to get a representative sample.
The interviews were conducted at eight-
een different Basic Command Units
(BCUs) and headquarters in eight different
police forces. This covers approximately
20 per cent of the 43 police forces in the
United Kingdom. The total number of
practitioners interviewed was 23. All the
interviews were conducted between
November 2004 and May 2005.
As part of the criteria used to identify
suitable interviewees, the sample was
defined to include several groups working
with intelligence within the police force
and the end result was ten intelligence
managers/coordinators, seven civilian ana-
lysts and six operational leaders. Interviews
were conducted with practitioners from all
three levels of the NIM (national, regional
and local) but the majority worked at the
local level (BCU).
The focused interviews concentrated on
the source/origin of the intelligence being
used to produce target packages and target
profiles (hereafter referred to as ‘intelligence
packages’) within the NIM. This naturally
needed to be handled with sensitivity and
so no operational or intelligence details
were sought. Only the derivation of the
intelligence collected, such as for example
informants, witnesses, communities and so
forth was recorded. Both the participants
and the sites have been kept anonymous.
Due to the nature of this research, which
involved police intelligence and therefore
sensitive data and personnel, some key eth-
ical principles were followed (Hayden &
Shawyer, 2004, p. 65). Official access was
sought through senior police officers. All
participation was voluntary and the candid-
ates were asked in advance to participate.
Some of the interviews were arranged
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through the interviewee’s leaders and it is
therefore important to recognise that this
may have influenced their willingness to
volunteer. Due to the nature of the topic
the candidates were not questioned about
personal information and all the data
obtained have been kept anonymous and
confidential. For this reason alone, there is
no categorisation of gender or age. Finally,
the interviews did not contain any ques-
tions that can reveal any sensitive intelli-
gence material.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The aim of the research was to examine
what constitutes intelligence within the
NIM. The author wanted particularly to
focus on the level of community intelli-
gence being used in comparison with other
sources of intelligence, based on the
hypothesis that community issues are
downgraded within the NIM. For the pur-
pose of this paper a summary of the findings
is presented here. The full data are held on
file with the author.
Intelligence in practice?
Having identified that there is no official
definition of intelligence within the NIM,
the author sought to explore the impact of
this on operational practice. Interviewees
were asked to give their personal definitions
of intelligence as users of the NIM. The
responses showed a variety of interpreta-
tions of the term ‘intelligence’ and it was
found that there is no clear consensus of
what the term constitutes in practice. Some
defined intelligence merely as information.
For example, interviewee K states that it is
‘intelligence from primarily any source’.
Part of the sample saw intelligence as
information that had gone through a process.
For example, interviewee Q stated that it is
‘information that has been given some
added value after being collated and
assessed’. Further, close to half of the inter-
viewees defined intelligence as a product,
something they could use to act upon; as
interviewee C sees it: ‘It is anything we can
use which allows us to take action’. Finally
a range of other respondents, primarily
intelligence managers, went further and
stated that currently intelligence is
‘evidence’:
It is the classic question between intelli-
gence and evidence. These days there is
very little difference. Some would say
action, some would say evidential. Intel-
ligence is evidence. (Interviewee V)
You as the investigation officer should be
at the scene looking for nothing — it
should all be there. (Interviewee G)
Without exceptions what the customers
want is evidence to arrest and charge.
The detectives want the intelligence unit
to do the investigation for them. (Inter-
viewee I)
Steve Richardson, from the ACPO NIM
Team, stated in interview, ‘the lack of a
clear, national guidance on the term “intel-
ligence” has led to a different understanding
of the concept throughout the country’.
This point was developed by Professor Nick
Tilley in an open-ended interview: ‘people
uses as synonyms terms that have different
meanings, such as “data”, “information”
and “intelligence”’.
These various definitions of the term
‘intelligence’ suggest different perceptions
about how to conduct the business. If intel-
ligence is thought of as actionable or evid-
ential products, how would that steer the
officers in terms of their choice of sources?
And what are these products used for? The
findings indicate that surveillance and
arrests are prioritised over the development
and use of community intelligence.
In order to explore this hypothesis fur-
ther, the interviewees were asked to give
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their personal interpretation of ‘community
intelligence’. Although the NIM does con-
tain a definition of ‘community intelli-
gence’, the interviewees were asked
specifically for their own definition of the
term. 49 per cent saw it as information from
the community; intelligence obtained
through engagement with the community.
For example, one stated:
It is intelligence we receive from a wide
range of sources, not only agencies but
special members of the community like
imams in the Muslim communities.
(Interviewee O)
Whereas, a few interviewees saw commun-
ity intelligence as information that has an
impact on the community:
It is actionable intelligence provided by
individuals or bodies of individuals or
members of a group who have interest in
directing the police to encounter crime
that is affecting their lives. (Inter-
viewee M)
Further, a minority understood community
intelligence as information about the com-
munity, for example Interviewee J stated
that it is ‘Intelligence which informs us of
what actually is happening in the neigh-
bourhood’. One interviewee even per-
ceived community intelligence to be
‘open-source’ material ‘like things on the
web, local newspapers and such’ (Inter-
viewee D). Another suggested that intelli-
gence was information from the police to
the community, looking upon the police
as risk-informers. The final interpretation
of the term ‘community intelligence’
viewed the term as defining communities’
understanding of their own problems (Inter-
viewee E).
These various interpretations of com-
munity intelligence imply different ways of
perceiving and using this source of intelli-
gence. What one police force sees as com-
munity intelligence may be different from
another. Furthermore, there is a risk within
the same police station that what one police
officer understands as community intelli-
gence is disparate from the views of other
officers.
The interviewees were asked to state
which source of intelligence they looked
upon as most important. Two groups stood
out: informants (43 per cent) and police
officers (43 per cent) (see Figure 1).
It can be seen in Figure 1 that informants
and police officers are viewed as the most
important source of intelligence followed
by police data (30 per cent) closely followed
by community intelligence (26 per cent).
Crimes, witnesses, and victims were men-
tioned by only a few, but it is important
to recognise that police data can contain all
of these.
Only 25 per cent of the interviewees saw
community intelligence as an important
source of intelligence, and a fundamental
issue raised by the data gathered was that 11
out of 23 interviewees did not feel that
community intelligence informed the work
that they did. A majority of the civilian
analysts answered thus, but many of them
pointed out that they would not know if
they dealt with community intelligence
because of the sanitisation process inherent
within the intelligence process of the
NIM:
The difficulty is how we manage com-
munity intelligence. It is lost in the pro-
cess. It needs to be stored in some way.
(Interviewee J)
Community intelligence would inform
the final package but it would not be
recognised in the final report. (Inter-
viewee K)
The intelligence from the community is
sanitised; the analysts are not to know
where the intelligence derives from. We
should probably flag the community
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intelligence to give it an audit trail.
(Interviewee V)
In an interview with Tim John, who has
evaluated the implementation of NIM in
three police forces (John & Maguire, 2003),
the loss of community intelligence through
the intelligence process was raised as a con-
cern. John’s view coincides with the above
statements from the practitioners; and these
views support the suggestion below that the
potential role of community intelligence
could be promoted by making it more
visible in the intelligence system.
The other half of the practitioners stated
that community intelligence did inform the
work they did, but a majority of the
answers revealed a focus on criminal activities.
Community intelligence was seen as
information that added to the picture, and
very few declared that they were using
community intelligence to improve the
community itself. It mostly added to the
qualitative side of the data or the qualitative
side of the intelligence packages. For most
it was not used as the main source of
intelligence, it just ‘. . . gives you a com-
plete picture’ (Interviewee S) and ‘the more
intelligence you get access to the clearer the
picture gets’ (Interviewee D).
The interviewees were then asked to
state the main source of their last five intel-
ligence packages. In relation to this, they
were interviewed about their personal
understanding of intelligence packages to
ensure that the question was understood
correctly. All the interviewees knew the
term and were familiar with the new terms
Note: Total percentage of interviewees adds up to above 100% due to multiple responses from
each.
Figure 1
Reported ‘important
sources’ of intelligence
(data gathered from
focused interviews with
23 practitioners
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for intelligence packages within the NIM,
namely ‘target’ and ‘problem’ profiles. The
term ‘intelligence package’ in the following
findings includes both ‘target profiles’ and
‘problem profiles’.
The data presented in Figure 2, based on
an open response to the question ‘what was
the main source of intelligence in the last
five intelligence packages?’, can be inter-
preted at both a conceptual and a statistical
level.
At the conceptual level, what is illus-
trated is a lack of a consistent understanding
and terminology, amply demonstrated by
the use of open answers rather than pre-
determined categories for respondents to
choose from. It could be argued that all
intelligence should be recorded on a data-
base in such a way that its source is dis-
guised and so protected. This would be
consistent with ACPO good practice guid-
ance (Harfield & Harfield, 2005, p. 16). In
this case, a unanimous response of police
data/computers/information systems could
have been reasonably anticipated since such
databases provide the audit trail for pro-
portionality, legitimacy and necessity for
actions founded upon specific intelligence.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that a
number of respondents were able to identify
specific sources from what should have been
anonymised records.
In the case of some respondents this may
be explained by the access their role would
have afforded them to raw intelligence. For
those respondents without such access it
should not have been possible to identify
source categories and this begs further
questions, outside the scope of the present
study, about adherence to good practice
and possible formulaic approaches to the
5 × 5 × 5 system of intelligence assessment
(which is a mechanism to evaluate source
credibility and information integrity, and to
define handling procedures which, if used
formulaically, could be a means to identify,
and therefore potentially compromise, the
source).
Note: At the time of research, not all interviewees produced packages, thus the total of packages is
88.
Figure 2
Reported ‘main source’
of intelligence in last five
intelligence packages
(data gathered from
focused interviews
Kleiven
Page 267
At the statistical level the data demon-
strate that in 44 per cent of the cases, police
data/computers/information systems were
the main source of intelligence in their last
five intelligence packages. More than one-
third came from informants (38 per cent).
This means that out of the 88 packages that
were produced at the time of the research
(February to May 2005) 82 per cent of the
intelligence derived from informants and
the police data, with only 15 per cent
identifiable as being based upon community
intelligence.
One can deduce from this that the intel-
ligence being used in the majority of the
packages is the ‘user friendly’ intelligence
leading directly to an intervention, for
example an arrest or a warrant. And from
this, it might be further inferred that intelli-
gence which does not lead to an immediate
‘hit’ (namely intelligence that requires fur-
ther development and/or corroboration) is
being avoided, for example community
intelligence about quality of life issues. One
of the interviewees stated: ‘We know what
we want from our informants — it’s more
readily actioned upon [sic]’ (Interviewee V).
Over 25 per cent of the interviewees stated
that the use of informants was primarily
related to drugs use, with Interviewee P
stating: ‘We use informants, but it’s all about
drugs’ and Interviewee I adding that ‘they
would talk forever about drugs dealings.
Informants’ intelligence, dubious though it
is, offers quick-hits for cops, particularly if
it’s drugs-related’.
The research found that out of seven
civilian analysts interviewed, only one
actively went out and sought community
intelligence. One analyst stated that they
were not covered by the insurance, another
that the police officers did not like it. Two
said they were afraid to reveal sensitive
information when interacting with the
community:
I would not actively look for information
outside the police force because of secur-
ity access and the fear of revealing con-
cern you have about an area. But I
certainly think it would be helpful if
I could do that. (Interviewee F)
The above statement indicates that some
practitioners using the NIM have problems
communicating with the public because of
sensitivity issues. Three of the interviewees
expressed scepticism about certain aspects
of community intelligence. It is important
to examine if this is an important reason
why community intelligence is not used
more often. As two of the interviewees
noted: ‘It is important to look at the
motives for community intelligence’ (Inter-
viewee M) and ‘within community intelli-
gence there is a risk of anecdotal
information’ (Interviewee N).
Some of the practitioners interviewed
blamed police officers for not making more
use of community intelligence. 30 per cent
of the interviewees, both civilian analysts
and police officers, pointed specifically to
the fact that it was difficult to obtain such
information from police officers. One of
the interviewees stated, ‘the problem is to
get the information from inside the person’s
head into the intelligence system’ (Inter-
viewee G). Two of the interviewees
expressed the opinion that:
Police officers go to community meet-
ings and never come back with informa-
tion. Probably want to deal with it
themselves — it’s theirs — they are miss-
ing the big picture. You have to report a
crime, but intelligence; you can choose
to report that. (Interviewee A)
It all falls down if the [Police Officers]
don’t feed intelligence into the system.
It is difficult to change police culture.
You can drag a horse down to the water
but you cannot make it drink. (Inter-
viewee J)
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So why is community intelligence not more
highly valued? Is it because officers do not
get any credit for it, or is it that many of the
officers are not familiar with the NIM,
lacking recognition of how they can con-
tribute to the product? Four interviewees
supported this view, one of them stating
that:
. . . new police officers don’t know any-
thing about NIM. The intelligence man-
agers are the only ones who understand
it. The officers do not have time to learn
it. All the officers need to know is the
outcome. (Interviewee I)
Some officers stated that they used their
experience and their knowledge instead of
intelligence, one of them expressing this
view:
You should target offenders before they
commit crimes. The purist will say; ‘but
you haven’t got any intelligence’. I would
say; ‘it’s his lifestyle to commit crime’.
(Interviewee U)
It should be noted that not all the inter-
viewees criticised the police officers for not
using community intelligence more. 25 per
cent of the practitioners (all but one of
them police officers; chiefs of operations
and intelligence managers) mentioned per-
formance indicators as a reason for not
making more use of community intelli-
gence. Many of them stated the same thing,
expressed by Interviewee P: ‘I am not being
measured by the fall in anti-social behaviour
. . . I don’t have any targets on that’. Not all
felt that the performance indicators in
themselves were a bad thing: ‘I do support
performance indicators — the work gets
done. The question is; do we have the right
performance indicators?’ (Interviewee U).
Tim John stated in interview:
NIM should be creative. We found very
little evidence that this was done. Every-
thing is measured against performance
indicators. Police managers are very con-
cerned with performance indicators and
will always prioritise actions that will
have an effect on the charts.
John Grieve, a former Deputy Assistant
Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police,
stated in an interview with the author that
one of the challenges posed by gathering
community intelligence is that the public
do not trust the police. He also identified
that the problem with the NIM and com-
munity intelligence is the lack of ‘educated
customers’, meaning that police managers
are not sufficiently trained in the use and
management of intelligence. This view was
supported by one of the practitioners, who
stated that ‘one of the problems with ana-
lysis is that the senior managers don’t know
what they want or what to ask for’ (Inter-
viewee O).
All the interviewees were given an
opportunity to give their personal opinion
as to what they would have done differently
if the NIM was implemented all over again.
Strikingly, the one issue that most agreed
on was that they would have named it
differently: ‘I would have named it differ-
ently so it does what it says on the tin; “The
National Policing Model”’ (Interviewee
H). Another view worth noticing when
discussing what the NIM is seeking to
achieve is that of Interviewee T: ‘I would
not have called it NIM — I wouldn’t have
had intelligence anywhere near it because
it defines the outcome’. Tim John is of
the same opinion: ‘NIM isn’t about
Intelligence-led Policing. It is a business
model. It is a misleading title’.
In interview, Tilley stated, ‘Community
intelligence about what comprise priorities
and means of dealing with problems is often
neglected within the NIM, because it has
focused almost exclusively on law enforce-
ment and crime’. Tilley compared two
‘polar’ police forces in their approach to
crime detection and enforcement, ‘One is
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strongly NIM compliant. It does not have a
very good relationship with the community
but has good IT-structures through which it
identifies hot spots, linkages between
offences, and offenders to target. The other
is non-compliant with NIM, but has close
contacts with the community through
which it identifies suspects, relationships
between suspects and known trouble-
makers’.
DISCUSSION
The study found little evidence of the use
of community intelligence within the
NIM. Although the NIM is in theory
intended to involve the community, in
practice there is little evidence to demon-
strate such involvement in reality. Though
the NIM is a business model designed to
handle ‘community issues’ within its ‘busi-
ness’, placing ‘community safety’ among
desired outcomes, the findings indicate that
community intelligence is placed low down
on the list, and that the NIM is very much
about intelligence-led policing in its purest
form, meaning ‘rounding up the usual sus-
pects’. This means using traditional intelli-
gence and analysing to find out who was
involved with whom, where and with what
crime plans and to use performance indi-
cators to display successes in detection,
arrest and prosecution of serious and pro-
lific offenders (Tilley, 2003a, p. 4). The
NIM is in many ways a panoptic device;
everyone is expected to feed the centre but
the centre is designed on a ‘need to know’
basis so that those on the outside, including
most police officers, cannot look inside. It is
very much about collecting information but not
informing. Grieve (2004) states that it is
difficult with the present culture of secrecy
around intelligence and that it is necessary
to make intelligence less threatening to
the communities to make them come to the
police. The latter poses the question, ‘Is it
possible to combine an intelligence-led
approach built on a “need to know” basis
with a good relationship with the commun-
ity built on openness and trust?’.
It is possible to identify a number of
consequences from the low use of com-
munity intelligence. The obvious conse-
quence is a lack of structure or effectiveness
in dealing with the ‘softer areas’ within
policing like crime prevention and quality
of life issues, with deterioration in the rela-
tionship between the police and the public
as a result. Whilst these are important public
policy issues, there may also be graver con-
sequences, as seen recently in the Soham
murders, and the Stephen Lawrence case.
There is also a danger that not collecting
community intelligence can result in a loss
of the context, which can lead to a wrong
assessment (Butler, 2004).
The terrorist attacks in London on 7th
July 2005 throw up possibilities that an
intelligence model which embraced and
valued community intelligence could have
been more predictive of the terrorist
attacks. In connection with fighting terror-
ism, the then Home Secretary, Charles
Clarke highlighted the importance of com-
munity intelligence, stating that:
. . . in many of these issues intelligence is
brought not through intercept, not
through phone tapping, but by the exist-
ence of individuals within organisations
we are talking about who are giving
information about what is taking place.
(Evidence to Parliamentary Committee,
January 2005, as cited in Gregory,
2005.)
Following the attacks on 7th July 2005, the
journalist, Daniel McGrory (2005) reported
two cases where Muslim leaders had alerted
the police to concerns about members of
their community. In 2001, the Imam of
Brixton Mosque informed the police that
Richard Reid had been banned from prayer
groups because of his violent views and
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three months later Reid attempted to blow
up a passenger jet. In 2005 leaders in
Beeston, Leeds, warned the police about
the behaviour of three men and the com-
pany they were keeping. Months later these
men were three of the four London
bombers. There are risks involved with
drawing conclusions after the event and it is
not the argument of the author of this
article that the proper collection and evalu-
ation of community intelligence would
have definitely prevented these attacks. It is,
however, our argument that the systemic
failure of the NIM to integrate community
intelligence means that the police service
will always be poorly sighted on the poss-
ibility of future risks. Though there is a
definition of community intelligence in the
NIM, there is an obvious lack of guidance
on how to integrate and work with that
intelligence. The findings suggest that the
value of community intelligence needs to
be promoted amongst practitioners.
CONCLUSION
The answer to the question, ‘Where is the
intelligence in the National Intelligence
Model?’ can be found in the preliminary
work to the creation of this model; the
origin of intelligence-led policing was the
report from the Audit Commission criticis-
ing the CID’s poor performance, followed
by the introduction of the NIM to organise
the process of intelligence better; namely
using intelligence more efficiently to
increase detections. The original guidance
for the NIM did not need a definition of
intelligence because it was culturally
accepted that this was about the collation of
evidence to increase detections. The emer-
gence of the concept of community intelli-
gence did need a definition because police
officers could not see how it served the
primary purpose of increasing detections.
In a changing world exhibiting increased
possibility of inter and intra community
tensions, a reduction of public confidence
in the police service and the challenge of
further terrorist activity in the United
Kingdom, the police service cannot con-
tinue to depend on systems which are
purely focused on law enforcement. Wil-
liamson (2005, p. 1, para. 5) argues that the
future of policing will be about trust and
networks:
Running in parallel with the recognition
of the importance of social networks
there are exciting new developments in
information technology. This will make
an enormous amount of information
available to people at all levels and when
this starts to happen community policing
will have moved from being intelligence
led to knowledge based.
The question, ‘Where’s the “intelligence” in
the National Intelligence Model?’ takes on
a specific poignancy after 7 July 2005. In
this case there was no intelligence. The
challenge for the police service will be how
to respond to that absence and how to
reconfigure the NIM with the type and
quality of intelligence that will predict
future risks. This will require the police
service to move away from the command
and control processes of the NIM to a more
complex and negotiated position. It will
require a cultural change and an increase in
knowledge based decision-making. The
police service and the NIM must change,
but it will not be possible to make these
changes until it is recognised how they are
currently failing to deliver. This article seeks
to make a contribution to those changes.
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